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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: The Next Generation of Container Ships
Malacca-Max and Alternative Patterns
of Operation
Degree: MSc
The transport industry has forever pivoted around the well-known concept of
economies of scale given the size of the capital involved and the necessity to
minimise, as much as possible, the unit cost. The dissertation is a study of the effect
of the growing size of container ships, namely the Malacca-max, by comparing the
results of operation as mentioned in previous studies with those obtained in this study
when applying a different operational pattern.
The approach started with a glance at the growth of the container trade through the
evolution of world trade, then the potential of container trade, present routes and
related operational patterns. The economies of scale are examined by looking at the
capacity of present container ships and how the largest ship has almost doubled in
size compared to the first post Panamax ship from twelve years ago. In addition, how
container operator companies have joined to achieve bigger and bigger volumes is
considered and the future development in containerisation is presented. The
challenges that exist are discussed, in particular the deep draft of such a large ship.
Alternative solutions to the dredging of the Suez Canal are introduced in the light of
the use of the new ports under construction in Egypt. Likewise the use of a suggested
land bridge is part of the solution.
The conclusion is based on the comparison of cost and time with the original study,
alonge with a sensitivity analysis and transhipment comparison. The suggested
solutions are found comparable with those in the original study. A number of suitable
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The growth in container ships size so far has been unlimited. Recently a Dutch
professor and student team introduced a design of a container ship that carries 18000
boxes (more than twice the capacity of present vessels), the draft of which will be 21
meters when fully laden. The ship is named Malacca-max, after the Malacca strait
which is the third natural water barrier for ships (after the Panama and Suez Canals).
The ship will not be able to transit the Suez Canal with this draft.
Mega carriers usually operate between the two markets of Europe and the Far East,
thus transiting the Suez Canal is essential for them, However, there are some
restrictions with regard to the draft and beam of vessels. The limitation of container
ships size has not been realised yet, but is foreseen to take place in the near future,
therefore the search for alternatives is a necessity.
Finding alternatives will have an impact on the present known operational patterns,
whereas container-trading markets will remain the same. The growth in the container
trade encourages the upsizing of ships whereby economies of scale play a major role.
The costs can be minimised and a bigger market share is achieved, especially for
global players and alliances.
Based on the study made by the Dutch professor, a giant ship will not be able to pass
the Suez Canal unless the Canal is dredged since the maximum permissible draft is
17.6 meters.
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This paper presents suggested solutions to enable the ship to transit the Suez Canal.
The solutions include introduction of different operational patterns through the use of
new ports under construction in Egypt at both ends of the Suez Canal. By using
Egypt’s ideal location in the middle of main sea transport stream, no deviation will
be required by ships from their main route. An impact on Egypt’s national economy
will be expected and also on the industry through the use of larger ships.
One of the suggested solutions is a land bridge in Egypt linking the Mediterranean to
the Red Sea, through the use of multimodal transport. A similar solution for VLCCs,
which have a draft and beam restriction to pass the Suez Canal was introduced by the
SUMED company for pipelines, where crude oil or products are transferred from the
Red Sea to the Mediterranean sea by means of pipe lines.
A cost analysis will be presented, and the best solution recommended.
The reason behind the selection of this topic stems from the vitality of the issue for
Egypt as revenue from the Suez canal accounts for a big percentage of Egypt’s total
GDP and anything that affects it will pose a direct threat to the national economy.
3
Chapter 2
GROWTH IN CONTAINER TRADE
2.1 Evolution in world trade
World trade has grown more rapidly than world production since World War II. Due
to the continuous diminishing of trade barriers in recent years such trade has been
accelerating. In addition, the development in technology, communications and
transport has continued this acceleration.
Barriers are known to be natural and artificial, the latter is concerned with trade
policy matters and the natural barriers are related to the trade transaction process, in
particular transport.
The formation of a global integrated market place is the result of the development of
transport technology that has led to cost reductions and improved productivity. Ever
since this improvement in transport began the world trade kept growing steadily.
The impact of new transport techniques and specialised shipping has been significant
on world trade. In liner shipping, containerisation was introduced offering transport
quality and faster transit times.
World trade has almost consistently outpaced the world GDP on account of the
globalisation of trade on the one hand and a significant reduction in the cost of
transportation and communication on the other. The carrying capacity of the world
merchant fleet has increased with world trade, with more than 95% of world
transportation being ship-borne.
In fact, it can be claimed that the development and realisation of shipping has been
an important and contributing factor to the growth in world trade.
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Table 2.1 Seaborne trade volume in tonne-miles
in billion tonne-miles
Crude Oil Iron Coal Grain Other % of Total % change over
Year oil Prod. ore cargo Total trade prev. Year
1975 8885 845 1471 621 734 2810 18.3 15366 -6.2
1980 8219 1020 1651 957 1087 3720 22.3 16654 -5.1
1985 4007 1150 1702 1473 1004 3750 28.7 13086 -3.0
1986 4640 1265 1699 158 914 3780 27.3 13856 5.9
1987 4671 1345 1761 1622 1061 3840 26.9 14300 3.2
1988 5065 1445 1950 1682 1117 4040 26.4 15299 7.0
1989 5736 1540 2012 1752 1095 4250 25.9 16385 7.1
1990 6261 1560 1978 1849 1073 4400 25.7 17121 4.5
1991 6757 1530 2008 1999 1069 4510 25.2 17873 4.4
1992 6977 1620 1896 2001 1091 4650 25.5 18235 2.0
1993 7251 1775 2001 1949 1038 4840 25.7 18854 3.4
1994 7330 1860 2165 2014 992 5100 26.2 19461 3.2
1995 7225 1945 2287 2176 1160 5395 26.7 20188 3.7
1996 7363 2040 2227 2217 1126 5705 27.6 20678 2.4
1997 7677 2050 2444 2332 1169 6000 27.7 21672 7.4
1998 7820 1970 2430 2215 1050 5940 27.7 21425 3.6
Av. Growth
Rate 75/98 -0.6 3.7 2.2 5.7 1.6 3.3 1.5
Rate 90/98 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.3 -0.3 3.8 2.8
Source: Fearnleys Review, various issues
2.2 Container trade potential
The trading world changed in the 1950s as labour became more and more expensive.
In liner shipping productivity became more important than flexibility. Liner
companies lost many of the core trades with independence gained by the colonies.
The growth in the 1950s and 1960s in trade was between the prosperous industrial
centres of Europe, North America and Japan. The need for fast reliable and secure
transport became obvious. At this time cargo liners’ costs and complexity became a
barrier with increased time in port costing shippers a lot more through tied up capital.
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Unitization, through the standardisation of cargo was the solution to raise
productivity. This was done by liner companies investing in mechanised systems and
equipment, which automated the transport process.
Containerisation started in the United States in the 1956. Containers were used by
trucking and railway companies. The idea of an easily detachable single unit, which
can be transferred from one transport mode to another, is known as intermodalism.
Malcom McLean as an experienced trucker, had the idea of a cargo handling system
that included the sea as a transport mode in addition to road and rail. The first regular
service of deep-sea containers was started in the north Atlantic in 1966 by Sea-Land;
a company set up by Malcom McLean.
European liner companies later set up their own container services. The development
of all related activities such as standardising containers, ship building, trucks and
port terminal facilities took place. By 1995 there were 9.6 million TEUs in the
international container business.
The container system proved to be extremely effective with regard to cargo handling
speed and time in port. In addition, the intermodality improved due to the
standardisation of the unit handled.
Twenty years later major liner routes were containerised. Due to unitization liner
companies started to compete and they were able to offer door to door service. A
complete service from point of origin to point of destination became a part of this
sector in the shipping industry. The fierce competition forced the industry to become
more concentrated by consolidation and the merging of companies.
International Association of Ports and Harbors I.A.P.H 1999 mentioned “Drewry
Shipping Consultants mentioned the global port throughput for 1997 was 170 million
TEUs. A predicted growth of up to 2005 is estimated of an additional 100 million
TEUs (6% per annum).” The growth figures show that container activity has grown
year after year and will continue to grow.
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The table below illustrates these figures in detail
Table 2.2 Global Port Throughput In Million TEU
      Expected Growth            Total at 2005
At 1997 TEU Increase % TEU Increase %
Asia 73.40 43.60 59.40 117.00 37.26
Western
Europe
38.60 23.70 61.40 62.30 38.04
North America 24.50 7.80 31.84 32.30 24.15
South America 11.50 9.20 80.00 20.70 44.44
Middle East 8.00 6.10 76.25 14.10 43.26
Africa 5.30 3.40 64.15 8.70 39.08
South Asia 4.30 4.90 113.95 9.20 53.26
Australia 3.80 1.30 34.21 5.10 25.49
Eastern Europe 0.90 1.00 111.11 1.90 52.63
Total 170.30 101.00 59.31 271.30 37.23
Source: Drewy Shipping Consultants
Container transport is the fastest growing market in maritime transport sector this
growth is due to the following:
- The continued expansion of containerised shipping by developing countries.
- Increased trade in higher value goods.
- Trends towards globalisation by multinational manufacturers.
- The growth in deep-sea ship size and subsequent increase in feeder traffic and
transhipments.
On 1st  January 1999, the total capacity of the container vessel fleet was about 6
million TEUs, of which cellular vessels represented 4.2 million TEUs (70%). by 1st
May 2000, the total capacity of the container vessel fleet had increased about 6.5
million TEUs, of which cellular vessels represented 4.5 million TEUs (70%). The
table below illustrates these figures.
7
Table 2.3 Container Vessel Cellular Fleet
Size   (Only Cellular) 1/1/1999 1/5/2000 Increase %
Description Range Number TEU % of
Total
Number TEU % of
Total
Number TEU
Post-Panamax >5000 52 313075 7.4 72 434367 9.5 +38.5 +38.7
Panamax 3000/4999 342 1317194 31.0 359 1390688 30.5 +5 +5.6
Sub-Panamax 2000/2999 401 1001099 23.6 419 1042374 22.9 +4.5 +4.1
Handy 1500/1999 311 525154 12.4 347 589639 13.0 +11.6 +12.3
Handy 1000/1499 494 595418 14.0 491 584474 12.8 -0.6 -1.8
Feeder-Max 750/999 184 160626 3.8 200 174164 3.8 +8.7 +8.4
Feeder-Max 500/749 334 202870 4.8 337 204156 4.5 +0.9 +0.6
Feeder 100/499 412 127768 3.0 606 132579 2.9 +47.1 +3.8
TOTAL 2530 4243204 100.0 2652 4552459 100.0
Source: compiled from Alfaliner & Y.L.G database, http://www.or.jp/shiptrends_99.htm
During the past twelve years, 1,317 container vessels over 1,000 TEUs have been
built. As at 1st January 1999, 394 were able to carry over 3,000 TEUs and 52
exceeded 5,000 TEUs. There were 255 cellular container vessels on order on 1st
January 1999 providing a total additional capacity of 617229 TEUs but by the end of
year, the number of ships ordered had decreased by 8% while the total capacity of
the new orders had jumped to 30%, meaning that the direction is towards larger
sizes.
Table 2.4 Container ships on Order
Size   (Only Cellular) Jan. 99 Dec. 99 Change %
Description Range Ships TEU Ships TEU Ships TEU
Post-Panamax >5000 42 240668 74 429190 +76 +78
Panamax 3000/4999 31 127654 44 169074 +42 +32.5
Sub-Panamax 2000/2999 33 75172 42 103164 +27 +28
Handy 1000/1999 105 150082 54 81902 -48.6 -45
Feeder <1000 44 23653 33 19811 -25 -16
TOTAL 255 617229 247 803141 -8 +30
Source: Compiled from Alphaliner & Containerisation International
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These figures confirm the growth of the fleet with an amount of 803141 cellular slots
under construction.
Cellular container ships are divided into segments each serving a specific part of the
market achieving optimum productivity. The first three segments are feeder, feeder-
max and handy-size; they are mainly concerned with the short sea and draft restricted
trade. The second three segments are Sub-Panamax, Panamax and Post-Panamax all
serving the longer haul and deep-sea trade.
In recent months Post-Panamax tonnage dominated the order book compared with
Panamax, as seen from the following table.
Table 2.5 Structure of container Ship Fleet 1980 – 2000 (TEU x 1000)
Type 1980 1985 Inc. % 1990 Inc. % 1995 Inc. % 2000 Inc. %
Post Panamax 0 0 0.0 20 150 650.0 434 189.3
Panamax 20 90 350.0 310 244.4 750 141.9 1390 85.3
SubPanamax 230 350 52.2 550 57.1 700 27.3 1042 48.9
Handy 300 420 40.0 550 31.0 850 54.5 1174 38.1
Feeder Max 60 80 33.3 95 18.8 110 15.8 378 243.6
Feeder 100 155 55.0 160 3.2 220 37.5 132 -40.0
TOTAL 710 1095 54.2 1685 53.9 2780 65.0 4550 63.7
Source: Compiled from Clarkson Research Studies & other
The decision of the owners / operators to increase their fleets with large container
ships is driven by:
-    the powerful economies of scale of Post-Panamax compared to Panamax vessels,
- the highly competitive pricing regimes of shipyards for large container ships,
- the growth in global operating alliances which has meant that larger cargo
volumes are being moved by individual grouping justifying the deployment of
bigger ships.
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2.3 Container Trading Routes
The three main stream trade routes in container trade are transpacific, transatlantic
and East Asia to Europe. In addition, there are the North-South and the intra-regional
routes.
2.3.1 Trans-Pacific route
The biggest deep-sea liner route is between North America and the Far East with 7.5
million TEUs of trade representing 22% of the world total. The type of container
ships used on this route is Post Panamax because of the long transit time. To run a
weekly service this route requires 5-6 ships.
2.3.2 East Asia / Europe route
This route links East Asia from Japan to North Europe as far as Sweden. On this
route the trade amounts to 5 million TEUs.
2.3.3 Trans-Atlantic route
This links the East Coast of North America with Europe, the trade amounting to 3
million TEUs on this route.
2.3.4  The North-South route
Trade on this route is between the industrial centres of Europe, North America and
the Far East and the developing countries of Latin America, Africa, or developed
countries in the Far East and Australia.  The ships used on these routes are the
handysize of 1,600 TEUs and multi-purpose vessels, in addition to conbulkers.
2.3.5  The intra-regional route
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This is concerned with the distribution of cargo for base port to out-ports.  The major
trade is intra Asia and intra Europe.  Feeders and feedermax are running on these
routes.
The following table illustrates main container traffic
Table 2.6 Main Container Traffic in thousand TEUs
Intercontinental Trade TEUs % in Route % of Trade % of Grand Total
 East /West Routes
Trans-Pacific 7470 44.3 30.0 20.1
E. Asia/Europe 4895 29.0 19.6 13.2
Trans-Atlantic 3030 18.0 12.2 8.2
Europe/M. East 645 3.8 2.6 1.7
Asia/M. East 625 3.7 2.5 1.7
N. America/M. East 205 1.2 0.8 0.6
Total 16870 100.0 67.7 45.4
North/South Routes
L. America/N. America 2000 24.8 8.0 5.4
L. America/Asia 725 9.0 2.9 2.0
N. America/S. Asia 250 3.1 1.0 0.7
L. America/Europe 1150 14.3 4.6 3.1
Europe/Africa 950 11.8 3.8 2.6
N. America/Africa 100 1.2 0.4 0.3
Asia/Africa 425 5.3 1.7 1.1
Europe/S. Asia 475 5.9 1.9 1.3
Asia/S. Asia 425 5.3 1.7 1.1
Europe/Australia 400 5.0 1.6 1.1
Asia/Australia 875 10.9 3.5 2.4
N. America/Australia 275 3.4 1.1 0.7
Total 8050 100.0 32.3 21.7
Intercontinental Total 24920 100.0 67.0
Intra-Regional Trade
Intra-Asia 6750 55.1 18.2
Intra-Europe 4250 34.7 11.4
Intra-N. America 1250 10.2 3.4
Intra-Regional Total 12250 100.0 33.0
Grand Total 37170 100.0
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants 1996
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2.4 Container operational Patterns
The main reason behind operational patterns is the variance between different trading
routes in terms of volumes of cargo, trade balance and traffic stability.  The search
for cost competitiveness and the deployment of different sized ships have led to new
operational patterns
The operation system can be defined as a network of nodes and links.  Ports are the
nodes and ship routes are the links.  A network is a link between 2 nodes.  To take
advantage of economies of flow accumulation (bus principle), most operational
patterns are multi nodes; thus, by accumulating several inter-nodal flows a service
can use larger ships with lower slot costs. Operators use the following major
operational patterns:
End-to-end: A-B-A itinerary
The pendulum: A-B-C-B-A Itinerary
Round the world: A-B-C-D-E-…-A itinerary one-way or two-way
However, the integration of operations and the co-operation between lines has led to
the combining &/different operational patterns into a service pattern.
2.4.1 End-to-end
This pattern exists between two markets.  The stability and the balance in traffic in
two directions are important.  It can be operated on many routes, east-west or north-
south, with any size.  End-to-end is an easy pattern to manage. It can be made with
one ship or more, but the disadvantage of it is the imbalance trade, where ships must
carry empty containers.  The repositioning of empty boxes increases the costs of the
carriers.  The other disadvantage is the need to call at a port once on the inbound
voyage and again on the outbound voyage.
2.4.2 Pendulum
Pendulum is a combination between two end-to-end patterns with the advantage of
elimination of double port calls.  It covers 3 markets, with middle market serving as a
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fulcrum.  It is widely used on east-west routes and lager ships are usually deployed in
this pattern.  The disadvantage is that the size of vessel could be too big for one
market at one end.  However, the pendulum pattern serves as a partial remedy to
reduce the end-port effect by devising a liner service.  The opportunity for
accumulation of flow in multi-trade leg pendulums is higher than a single service,
thus, operators tend to employ larger ships on this pattern.
2.4.3 Round-the-world
An attempt to close the gap and convert the pendulum pattern into a continuous
service round the world linking three markets in one direction.  This pattern requires
about 12 ships for weekly service, and the whole voyage can be made in about 80
days.  The circular route in round the world service allows for more uniform and
higher utilisation of ship’s space. it also allows unbalanced flows to be coped with by
separation of services by direction, thus employing ships of different capacity on east
bound and west bound services.
The advantages of the round the world service are found to be as follows:
• The cost advantage is substantial where this service diminishes the adverse cost
effect of trade imbalance or traffic volume disparities by combining flows from
three major trades, thereby sustaining reasonably high achieved load factors
despite these imbalances.
• Additional opportunities to earn revenue by way porting (double dipping)
wherein a slot is used more than once on a given leg of the voyage.
• The advantage of allowing a stronger sequence of the itinerary to subsidise a
weaker sequence.
• Considerable savings can be secured in the container inventories and logistics
within the global system. Empty container flows and equipment inventory levels
can be reduced. Overall the directional imbalances of trade are more easily
accommodated in this service.
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The disadvantages of round the world service are found to be as follows:
• The service requires an extensive feeder network and transhipment service where
costs can be considerable. Sometimes the scale economies of large vessels are not
sufficient to offset the costs of large-scale feeding and transhipment operations.
• A serious imbalance of container inventory can develop due to the difference in
cargo volume and marketing success between the traffic generating regions.
However, a new round the world service is suggested, pending on the expansion of
the Panama Canal, together with agreed related service patterns.  This will involve a
massive conversion of end-to-end, pendulum and traditional round the world patterns
into a new equatorial round the world service, which will employ even larger ships.
Furthermore there is a number of sub-systems related to the basic operational
patterns. These subsystems are found to be as follows:
• Hub-spoke:
Is concerned mainly with transhipment activities.  It joins the big ships with small
feeders.  In order to avoid longer time spent in ports by bigger ships, they can call at
a few transhipment hub ports with feeders moving between hubs and other ports to
cover a bigger range.  The disadvantage of this pattern is the higher cost incurred due
to transhipment and containers’ longer transit time.
• Double dipping:
Is a combination between 2 routes intercontinental and intra-regional, where the
latter is more profitable than the former one.  This is done by calling at hub ports on
main lines on both ways of a round trip taking the advantage of relatively higher paid
intra-regional market.  Meanwhile slots will be utilised more than once and marginal
costs drop significantly for larger ships than regional ships.
• Triangle:
Is the combination of three end-to-end operations to counter the trade imbalance
problem between three markets, for example, the trade between Asia, Japan and
Australia. To avoid the trade imbalance, the ship’s rotation goes from Asia to Japan
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to Australia and back to Asia again. This pattern enables the operators to overcome
trade imbalance in a certain direction, thus achieving better utilisation.
The balance
Although in the last ten years the balance preference has changed remarkably with
pendulum routing, it now accounts for almost one quarter of all the main weekly
east-west services compared to just 9% in 1990. The Following Table illustrates that
Table 2.7 Evolution of routing preferences on East-West trades
(number of weekly services)
N.Europe-Far East Tranpacific Transatlantic
1990
End-to-End 9 26 11
Pendulum 1 3 1
RTW 2 2 2
Total 12 31 14
1998
End-to-End 18 28 16
Pendulum 2 13 3
RTW 1 1 1
Total 21 42 20
1999
End-to-End 19 33 15
Pendulum 4 14 4
RTW 1 1 1
Total 24 48 20




3.1  Economies of Scale in the Container Trade
The increase in size of vessels has been greatest in the specialised trades where
transport integration has provided the investment in ports and cargo-handling
facilities needed to operate large vessels.
A substantial saving in cost could be achieved by using large vessels; the size of
these savings depending on the size of vessel and the length of voyage.  The aim is to
move the cargo as cheaply and efficiently as possible.
Reduction of unit cost is one of the basic principles in the shipping industry.  This
can be done by increasing the size of the cargo on the shipping leg.  Bigger ships
have lower unit costs, and unit cargo handling and storage are also cheaper at high
throughput volumes.  As a result the container trades are under constant economic
pressure to increase the size of cargo consignments.
The choice of strategy for a firm can improve or erode its position within an industry
thereby yielding a return on investment or achieving losses. In coping with a
competitive force the three generic strategic approaches to outperform competitors as
defined by Porter are: overall cost leadership, differentiation and focus. Cost
leadership is self-explanatory, differentiation is a unique product or service and focus
implies finding a market niche.
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For container shipping there are limits for the differentiation and focus especially in
the main line trades. However, cost control is a constant concern and cost leadership
is a worthwhile goal, thus it is associated with economies of scale, where capacity
addition is now taking place the increase in size of the ships rather than any increase
in number.
Based on the theory of scale economies, the size of container ships has increased
continuously. For larger vessels the break-even factor will be lower due to lower unit
costs that are achieved by them through economies of scale. As the unit costs of
transport service decrease with the increase in ship size the earnings per unit of
transport service increase (if freight rates are steady). Equally building costs do not
increase in direct proportion to cargo capacity increase. Accordingly larger vessels
are more economical and competitive, both in operation and in building costs.
A comparison between different container ships cost shows the relation between ship
size and unit cost in the following table.
Table 3.1 Container Ships Cost Comparison
Cost US$
Capacity TEU/Day TCE Transport
Ship TEU TEU/Day Sea days
Tokyo Senator 3017 10.74 5.16 225.71
Hannover Express 4407 10.84 6.00 228.57
Hyundey Admiral 4411 10.19 5.59 213.71
Hanjin London 5302 9.89 5.68 210.00
P&ON Southampton 6674 9.26 5.00 192.86
Maersk K-class 7500 9.05 5.20 191.43
Maersk S-class 8600 8.74 5.05 182.29
Source: Wijnolst N., Malacca Max, Delft University Press, the Netherlands
An evolution in the shipping industry was produced following the free market
capitalist’s model.  This evolution is reflected in the trade of today’s global economy
as follows:
• Growth of market
• Competition for customers
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• Economies of scale
• Consolidation of industry
This evolution will continue well into the 21st century in the light of the current
political and socio-economic environment.
Out of these four trends we find that economies of scale is the one that is shaping the
future of the shipping industry.  The natural struggle for bigger, thus more efficient,
economies is driving an internal industrial revolution – one that is already changing
the size and shape of things in the commercial shipping industry.  Bigger ships are
being put into service today.  Mega ships are causing port managers to think about
the way they do business, and as a result this evolution of mega ports is being
introduced to serve these mega ships.
3.2  Development in ship size
The developments of large container ships started years ago in 1980 but only recently
have vessels come close to 8000 TEUs. Efforts are being aimed at an improving
economy by increasing ship size. The first generation constructed in 1956s was able
to carry 700 TEUs and by the 1970s the 3rd generation was able to carry 3000 TEUs
with Panamax dimensions. In 1984 the Panamax Jumbo Econships were able to carry
4432 TEU. Due to the constant innovation in container ships design, the new
Panamax design can carry approximately 4500 TEUs. Such an increase of 50%
reveals the efforts made in developing of an efficient container ship.
Demand is affected by the world economy and the growth of global trade has been
substantial in the period since World War II.  In addition, the price of commodities,
the length of haul, political events and transport costs affect demand.
Variables that affect supply are the number of vessels in the world fleet, fleet
productivity, shipbuilding, scrapping and losses, interest rates and subsidies and
freight rates.
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In general, there is an excess of cargo carrying capacity; thus, the fleet capacity is
growing faster than world trade.  Between 1996 and 2000 the world container fleet
was predicted to grow by 10% while growth in world trade is targeted at 6.3% which
virtually guarantees excess capacity.
The current size of ships varies quite dramatically.  In recent years, the barrier of the
Panama Canal, which limits vessel beams to less than 110 feet, was surpassed.
While several container shipping companies have chosen to build ships too large for
the Panama Canal there has not been a wholesale shift in this direction.  These
vessels are referred to as post-Panamax and the largest can carry 8700 TEU and are
limited to a few ports with sufficient infrastructure.
The Panamax vessel, which was designed to be able just to pass the locks of Panama
Canal, was optimised to accommodate more cargo within the same dimensions.  The
scale of operation of this type of ship has significantly increased due to the growth in
trade and the tough competition between liner operators.  The only way to survive
and compete was to cut costs continuously through the use of larger vessels which
can transport containers in a cheaper and more efficient way than smaller ships.
In 1980, some operators abandoned the Panamax design and the tendency was
toward building even bigger ships than the Panama Canal can accommodate which
were to sail only in the Pacific.
Later, other operators followed and large number of post panamax ships were built.
Some operators are still operating the panamax due to the flexibility of this size
which they believe is more important than the scale advantage of the bigger ships.
The Maersk S-class is the largest ship so far with an official capacity of 6600 TEU
(able to carry 8700 TEU depending on container weight)
3.3  Limitations on economies of scale
There are several reasons that limit the economies of scale and which are considered
as barriers to the shipping industry. These are:
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• ship size increase at the expense of service frequency
• longer turn around time is necessary for cargo discharge
• inefficiencies generated by inadequate cargo handling infrastructure (both pier
side and further inland) at the port further erode the benefits derived from
increased size
• increased or non-competitive land transport costs
• physical limitation of port geography (inadequate channel size and depth,
insufficient pier space)
• uncertainty over future trade volumes and routes.
These substantial barriers for shipping companies represent a counter force to the
realisation of economies of scale.  Shipping lines do not exercise complete control
over these barriers and there will always be the risks of guessing given the available
information as to what an efficient solution might be.
Speed is another barrier to the ever-increasing size of container vessels as with each
step up in size, the speed increases due to the correlation between the length of haul
and size of vessel.  Higher speed brings the cost upward dramatically.  With the high
proportion of fuel costs in the total cost, the operators target is to find the optimal
speed.
The physical constraints of many harbours represent an impassable barrier. Many
ports do not have an adequate infrastructure, such as dockside cranes and inland
transportation connections, to move the volume of cargo these ships are capable of
offloading. The ability of the port to handle cargo quickly and efficiently becomes a
constriction point for the large vessel. Excess time spent on the dock begins to
undermine economies realised by an increase in size.
Mega ships can only utilise a handful of ports around the world. Even in the ports
with sufficient channel depths, the inland transportation inadequacies create
bottlenecks and lag times that are substantial. Consequently, not only the flexibility
of the shipping line is reduced but also the threat of increased time in port handling.
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3.4  Other ways to achieve economies of scale
The trend towards consolidation in the form of mergers is a recurring theme among
major shipping lines. They are able to realise economies of scope and scale by
merging as well as reducing certainties.
The consolidation into larger companies with bigger ships will accomplish more
frequent services and bigger market share. Several companies in 1990 were formed
by pooling their ships. The global alliance was formed by APL, OOCL, MOL & Ned
Lloyd.  In 1994, the alliance had 187 container ships with 375000 slots.  The grand
alliance was formed by Hapag-Lloyd, NOL, NYK and P&OCL with 182 ships and
371000 slots. In 1995 a third alliance between Maersk and Sea-Land was formed
with a total of 206 ships.
Recently the merger of Maersk with Sea-Land and the American President Lines
with Neptune Orient Lines had a substantial impact on the quantity and type of
infrastructure that the ports they are calling at must provide. In the past two dedicated
terminals would have been needed to serve two operators, where as post merger only
one is needed. This reduces both the land and equipment requirement at the pier face
but tends to transfer the point of constriction to the inland transport costs.
A consortium is a form of co-operation, mainly between container carriers to
rationalise operations technically and commercially.
The development of liner consortia was in two stages. The first stage started in 1970
and featured vessel/space sharing and slot chartering, co-ordination of sailing
schedules and port of call, a prefixed traffic quota for each carrier, harmonisation of
commercial activities and maintenance of a common co-ordination office.
When the market situation changed in the eighties, the too rigid structure of consortia
became a disadvantage vis-à-vis independent carriers. In 1980 the consortia began to
fall apart.
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Heavier capital investment requirement, poorer freight rates and fiercer competition
has accentuated the old problem of technical and commercial harmonisation of lines
to rationalise the use of assets.
The second stage is the alliance, where liner shipping co-operation takes shape by
grouping big shipping lines trading on the main world maritime routes. Alliances are
a kind of consortia with the main objective based on technical agreements. Container
lines with a similar scale of operation supported by feeder services are forming
alliances. They are less restrictive than the first stage of consortia and they target cost
cutting and improving quality of service.
The cost cutting on the sea leg seems to be more and more limited; therefore the
competitive edge remains on the land-side. Members of an alliance co-operate in
transport equipment and port terminal facilities that account for 70% of the cost for a
typical door to door container delivery.
The volume created by the alliance members gives much more negotiating weight
when discussing rates with port service and inland transport providers.
In an alliance each party gains a specific advantage from a joint operation. thus by
working together these parties create a competitive advantage.
Shipper requirements have driven the development of alliances. Bigger vessels and
global alliances are needed to cater for multinational companies which are producing
and assembling their products in a large number of countries.
In a joint production the alliance achieves cost savings and gives its members access
to more services, like terminal sharing and shore based services, without having a lot
of costs. The cost reduction and the growth of revenues are the value added to a
successful alliance.
The CEO of Hapag Lloyd revealed that “the Grand alliance (of which Hapag
Lloyd is a member) has achieved about $40 million in savings for its members since
it was started in 1996 and much more savings are possible in the field of container
logistics”.
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Mergers and acquisitions are other forms of co-operation between carriers. Many
companies change hands, some disappearing in the process. Most of the carriers
acquired have been second or third tier operators.
Mergers and acquisitions have played a part in the concentration of ownership in the
liner shipping industry. This was driven by the faster rate of growth of the major
lines. The advantage of mergers and acquisitions over alliances is the savings in the
administrative costs as well as in the operational sphere, as they are basically cost
driven.
Cost saving can be made by pooling and rationalising equipment, co-ordinating
container logistics and collaborating on landside activities.
The levels of co-operation where carriers have commitments differ a great deal,
while the mixture of strategies differs according to the condition of each route. It can








Table 3.2 Liner Industry consolidation
Company Acquired Purchaser Date Annual TEUs Carried
FMG TMM 1996
CGM CMA 11/1996
DSR-Senator Lines Hanjin Shipping 1997 800000
Lykes Lines CP Ships 7/1997 275000
Contship containerlines CP Ships 10/1997 270000
APL NOL 11/1997
Blue Star Line P&O Nedlloyd 2/1998 186000
Ivaran Lines CP Ships 5/1998 110000
SCL Safmarine** 7/1998
South Seas Steamship Hamburg Sud 8/1998
Llod Triestino Evergreen 8/1998
Italia di navigazione D’Amico 8/1998 117000
Anzdl CP Ships 10/1998
Alianca Hamburg Sud 11/1998
ANL* CMA-CGM 11/1998 85000
Safmarine Container Lines Maersk 12/1998 600000
Tasman Express Line P&O Nedlloyd 1/1999
Barbican line (part) Hamburg Sud 1999
Barbican Line (part) Safmarine
Grupo Libra* CSAV
Montemar* CSAV
Transroll Hamburg Sud 7/1999
South Pacific Container Hamburg Sud 7/1999
Sea-Land Maersk 8/1999 3000000
Crowley Am. Trans.(part) Hamburg Sud 8/1999
* Liner interests only                                              ** Purchase of 25% of company not already owned
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd
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Table 3.3  Evolution of the Alliances
Original
Grouping
Global Alliance Grand Alliance Maersk/Sea-land Hanjin/Tricon KLine/YangMing/
Hyundai(HMM)
Original APL - MOL P&O - NYK Maersk/Sea-land Hanjin - DSR K Line - YangMing -
Line-up Nedlloyd- OOCL Happag Lloyd - NOL Senator - Cho Yang Hyundai (HMM)
Revised
Grouping




revised APL(NOL) - MOL P&O NedLloyd - NYK Maersk/Sea-land Hanjin - DSR -
UASC
K Line - YangMing
Line-up Hyundai Happag Lloyd - OOCL Senator- Cho Yang Cosco
MISC
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd
3.5  Individual operators
Despite the heavy costs involved in purchasing and operating larger container
vessels, some operators prefer to operate independently rather than through co-
operation with other lines. The idea behind this is to avoid the organisational
complexity existing in an alliance because of too many participants.
Evergreen and the Mediterranean Shipping Company are two carriers that prefer to
operate independently, believing that decision making is the key.
By introducing bigger ships and offering lower rates, independent operators win
enough cargo to fill their ships and cut down their average costs. Consequently their
voyage profit increases. On the other hand the members of the alliance will be left
with less cargo and rising average cost. Consequently their profit will be wiped out.
The main area that remains for competition is the inland services where alliances can
achieve a better cost reduction when moving containers to their final destination.
Smaller operators focus on specific regions with more flexibility towards customer
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3.6  Future Developments in Containerisation
The growth in containerisation since 1956 till now has been spectacular.  The volume
handled and the increase in trade has been characterised from the very beginning by
two factors: optimisation of ship design to carry the maximum possible number of
containers and improvement in economy by increasing the size of ships. As world
trade continues to grow, container trade volume follows.  This growth is obvious in
European and Asian ports and it will continue to grow even faster in some regions
like the Baltic and China.
The developments of large container ships started years ago in 1980 but only recently
vessels have come close to 8000 TEUs.  Efforts are aimed at an improvement in
economy by increasing ship size. Each generation of container ships is characterised
by the factors indicated in the following table.
Table 3.5 Generations of Containerisation






















































Source: Wijnolst N., 1999 Shipping Industry Structure, Delft University
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The effect of economies of scale have led to a rapid increase in ship size from
feeders to post Panamax.  The limits of development of the 8000, 12000 and 15000
TEU container ship are now not in the design, but come from the following aspects:
• the cargo handling facilities and logistics requirements for the ports
• the water depth in ports and port entrance
• the fluctuation in fuel prices
More efforts are being made on the cargo side as well.  Commodities that used to be
shipped in bulk or break-bulk form are now routinely being containerised; not only
high value cargo but low value as well.  This means that all market segments are
heavily influenced by logistics arrangements.
The lack of port infrastructure to load and unload bulk commodities in some markets
has meant the use of containers enabled them to trade. Moreover, containerisation
suited the markets that can deliver smaller volumes on a regular basis rather than in
bulk.
Fast container ships of 40 knots are due to start in 2002, allowing time sensitive
cargo to be moved in a more efficient way.  This will have an impact on the handling
facilities at ports receiving such kinds of ships.  Conventional handling cranes will
slow the transport process but a new handling system is being developed to cope
with these fast ships in order not to lose the time gained at sea by reducing time at
port.  The system uses a container pallet train to load and unload the ship, and can
unload a fast ship of 1423 TEUs in about 4 hours instead of 30 hours by conventional
handling systems.
The physical restraint for a further increase in container ship size remains in the Suez
Canal.  Suez-max container ships of 12000 TEU capacity are already being planned.




4.1 Container vessels of the next generation
The steady downward pressure on freight rates, coupled with the impending
requirement for carriers to replace outdated tonnage can mean only two things:
1) Lines are constantly searching for greater economies of scale (through upsizing)
in an effort to reduce unit costs.
2) As a significant fleet replacement programme is imminent anyway, the next few
years will be when the entry of big new ships should be most expected. Older and
slower ships will be scrapped in fairly large numbers over the next few years and
this will pave the way for a new generation. As illustrated in the table 4.2, 12%
(526113 TEUs of capacity) of the global container fleet is 20 years and older and
could be retired very soon.
Ship design development went very fast after the delivery of the 1st post PANAMAX
ship took place in 1988.  Thereafter the first 5000 TEU ship was delivered in 1995,
the first 6000 TEU ship in 1996 and the first 6600 TEU ship in 1997 (8700 if empty
containers on deck are taken into account)
A comparison  in table 4.1 between an optimised Panamax container ship, the first
post-Panamax container ship and the 6600 TEU container ship shows that the
advantages of first Post-Panamax container ships were very limited.
Although the container ships built so far can easily pass the Suez Canal, a further
size increase will reach the limit of this canal.
The concept of Suez-max container carriers is already being planned.  The design
was made according to the current maximum dimensions allowed within the Suez
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Canal today, which are, both in breadth and draft, for ships with a breadth of over
48.16 m and a maximum draft is 58 feet (17.67 m).
Table 4.1 Comparison of Container ship designs
Optimized Panamax First Panamax 6600 TEU
Length 294.0 m 275.2 m 347.0 m
Breadth 32.3 m 39.4m 43.0 m
Molded Depth 21.4 m 23.6 m 24.1 m
Draft 13.5 m 12.5 m 14.5 m
Deadweight 67680 t 54655 t 77000 t
Speed 23.8 kn 24.2 kn 25.0 kn
Power 36497 kw 41882 kw 55000 kw
Capacity 4422 TEU 4340 TEU 6600 TEU
Source: Wijnolst N. (1999), Shipping Industry Structure, Delft University
The following table illustrates container fleet age profile (for fully cellular vessels)
Table 4.2 Container Fleet Age Profile
Fully Cellular Number ,000 TEU      Fleet Ratio
Container Ships Age Profile (years) Age Profile (years) May Fleet /
Fleet Profile 25+ 20:24 15:19 10:14 5:9 0:4 25+ 20:24 15:19 10:14 5:9 0:4 2000 20 Yrs.+
100/249 66 40 14 4 6 17 10.2 6.9 2.5 0.7 1.0 3.3 24.6 70%
250/499 32 64 59 28 51 91 10.6 22.8 23.8 10.5 18.5 33.2 119.4 28%
Total Feeder 98 104 73 32 57 108 20.8 29.7 26.3 11.2 19.5 36.5 144 35%
500/749 14 33 56 18 55 144 9.2 20.3 32.6 11.4 33.2 89.1 195.8 15%
750/999 12 36 29 23 24 70 10.9 31.9 24.7 19.7 21.5 59.9 168.6 25%
Total Feedermax 26 69 85 41 79 214 20.1 52.2 57.3 31.1 54.7 149 364.4 20%
1000/1499 33 50 63 47 114 165 41.7 60.0 78.5 52.8 136.7 193.9 563.6 18%
1500/1999 6 28 33 45 74 148 10.4 47.7 58.8 79.5 125.0 244.6 566 10%
Total Handy 39 78 96 92 188 313 52.1 107.7 137.3 132.3 261.7 438.5 1129.6 14%
2000/2499 13 30 34 9 27 101 28.6 68.2 73.8 18.8 61.8 226.8 478 20%
2500/2999 2 29 26 48 20 45 6.0 79.9 70.7 130.3 55.5 126.8 469.2 18%
Total Sub-Panamax 15 59 60 57 47 146 34.6 148.1 144.5 149.1 117.3 353.6 947.2 19%
3000/3499 4 2 10 45 38 32 12.6 6.2 31.1 144.1 120.8 106.9 421.7 4%
3500/3999 6 20 37 36 23.1 75.4 137.1 136.1 371.7
4000&+(Panamax) 9 3 32 68 41.5 12.7 135.5 292.2 481.9
Total Panamax 4 2 25 68 107 136 12.6 6.2 95.7 232.2 393.4 535.2 1275.3 1%
4000/4499 5 10 1 21.7 43.9 4.5 70.1
4500/4999 9 13 42.8 63.8 106.6
5000/5499 30 157.8 157.8
5500/5999 17 94.8 94.8
6000+ 25 167.6 167.6
Total Post-Panamax 5 19 86 0 0 0 21.7 86.7 488.5 596.9
TOTAL 182 312 339 295 497 1003 140.2 343.9 461.1 577.6 933.3 2001.3 4457.4 11%
Source: Clarkson container intelligence
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 The main characteristics of the Suez-max and Malacca-Max container vessels as
described in a recent study by Wijnolst, (1999) and a student team are as follows:
Table 4.3 Characteristics of Suez-max and Malacca-Max container ships
Specification Suez-Max Malacca-Max
L O A (m.) 400 400
LwL (m.) 390 390
L B.P (m.) 380 380
Breadth (m.) 50 60
Draft  (m.) 17.04 21
Depth (m.) 30 35
Block Coeff. 0.62 0.62
Displac. (t.) 212194 313571
D.Weight (t.) 157935 242800
Speed (knots) 25 25
Capacity (TEU) 11989 18154
Layout Forward bridge and pram-shaped stern Forward bridge and pram-shaped stern
General Plan 25 blocks of 40’containers.
U/Dk 17 box wide.
O/Dk 19 box wide.
3 m. wide double skin
26 blocks of 40’containers.
U/Dk 20 box wide *12 tiers
O/Dk 24 box wide * 8 tiers
5 m. wide double skin
Propulsion 2*5 blades propeller D.8.6 m. 2*5 blades propeller D.8.6 m.
Engines 2*45768kw
Consumption/day 328 t.  f.o
2*62810kw
Consumption/day 430 t.  f.o
Stability 12 t. Homogenous * 11989 TEU GM is 0.31m
12 t.          ,,            * 11723   ,,        ,,     1.10m
14 t.         mix         * 11989   ,,        ,,     1.33m
14 t.          ,,            * 10281   ,,        ,,     2.16m
12 t. Homogenous * 18154 TEU GM is -
0.84m
12 t.          ,,            * 17482   ,,         ,,    1.00m
14 t. Mix 14/10 t.   * 18154   ,,         ,,    1.02m
14 t. Homogenous* 10281   ,,         ,,    0.98m
Hatches Open hatch Open hatch






The following table indicates the maximum allowable dimensions of vessel sizes and
draft to pass Suez Canal.
Table 4.4 Suez Canal Beam and Draft
Beam Draft
Meter Feet Meter Feet
48.16 158.00 17.07 56.00
50.00 164.00 16.45 53.96
55.00 180.33 14.94 49.00
60.00 196.83 13.11 43.00
60.96 200.00 12.65 41.50
Source: Fairplay Ports guide
• Loading and Discharging Malacca-Max container ship
A new design, which boosts the loading and discharging speed, has developed a new
concept capable of doing 70 moves per hour.  The outreach of this crane is 74
meters. This design is made by crane builder Huisman-Itrec.  The unloading is on
stages as follows:
Vertically out of hold, backwards to be delivered to an automatic trolley
which takes the container to the quayside to place it down on an elevator. This
elevator places the container at the bottom of the crane. The crane has a small storage
area underneath, which acts as a buffer to smooth the movements of containers away
from the quay.
A significant cost-reduction is achieved through up scaling of ship size.  A
comparison between large container ships is shown in the following table:
Table 4.5 Comparison of container ships Transport Cost (deep see only)
Ship Type Av. TEU Capacity Capacity Increase Transport Cost Savings
(than Panamax)  US$/TEU/Day (than Panamax)
Panamax 4000 0.0% 210 0.0%
Maersk s class 6600 65.0% 185 12.0%
Suez-max 12000 200.0% 178 15.0%
Malacca-Max 18000 350.0% 150 28.5%
Source: Wijnolst N., Malacca Max, Delft University Press, the Netherlands
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A considerable saving for Malacca-Max design accounts to anywhere between 16%
and 30% if compared to (Maersk S-Class) and Panamax design respectively in over
all cost reductions.  The transhipment costs and through transport, which constitute
80% of the total costs, are not included.  However, if the cost savings are calculated
over the total container transport costs, the cost savings are somewhere between 3%
and 6%.  Therefore, the costs savings that are made by using larger ships are not
offset by higher costs on shore.
The main challenge of Malacca-Max container ships lies in three areas:
1) Commercial:
A weekly service requires a number of ships and that is means very high investment
costs.  The dimension of this design limits its flexibility and prohibits its employment
in certain operation patterns like round the world where it cannot transit the Panama
Canal.
For employment in the Europe-Far East trade, even if it can pass the Suez Canal, it
will be dependent on one trade only and any economical problem (like the Asian
crisis in 1998) will have a severe impact by putting freight rates under pressure.
2) Technical:
If a vessel has to be taken out of service, this will result in an expensive replacement,
if any.
3) Land-side:
A limited number of ports will have the capability to handle the number of boxes
carried by these ships.  Not only loading and unloading these huge vessels will create




Amongst the ten largest ports, which account for more than 30% of the global
volumes in container, very few will be able to handle large ships due to physical
constraints of the water depth.  Principal options considered for handling large
vessels might be dredging, offshore terminals, new deep-water ports and lightening.
The choice of one of these options depends on how much traffic a port might be
willing to attract.  In addition, the port should have the necessary infrastructure and
enough land area, for the logistical operation and transhipment activities needed to
handle these ships.  For economical reasons, the deployment of Suez-max and
Malacca-Max ships will be in the East-west trade, transpacific or Europe/Far East.
Even by dredging operations and using the high water of the tide effect, major
container ports in North-western Europe like Hamburg, Antwerp, Felixstowe,
Bremerhaven will have draft restrictions for ships with a 15m draft.
Rotterdam is the only major port in North-western Europe that will be able to
accommodate such container ships of the next generation.  Rotterdam is developing a
new container terminal to become operational in 2003.  The partners in this project
are ECT and P&O Nedlloyd which have chosen the northernmost part of Maasvlakte
for further terminal expansion until 2010.  The site covers about 55 hectares with an
850 m quay.  Water depth is 16.65 m and the capacity is about 1M TEU a year.  The
future expansion could be 110 hectares, with 1500 m quay, 19 m water depth and 2M
TEU capacity.  Recently, more dredging has taken place to enable 5500 TEU ships
with 13.5 m draught to reach ECT home terminals.
Far East Singapore is a main container port where developments into a mega
container terminal facility is taking place.  In time to come Pasir Panjang Terminal
PPT will be the home of Singapore’s mega container facility.  The area dedicated for
this development is 84 hectares and contains 6 main berths with 15 m draft.  An
important part of the East-west trading route is passing via the Suez Canal.  There is
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a good chance for ports under construction in this area, having a strategic location, to
take advantage by attracting such mega ships by considering their requirements,
while under construction (in dredging and equipment).  At both ends of the Suez
Canal, East of Port Said Port and Suez, mega ships could be served without any
deviation in their voyage in two ways:
1) Transhipment activity
2) Lightening activity
The two interrelated activities will serve large container ships of the next generation
with a deep draft to achieve two goals. The first is to have more containers to be
transhipped to the Mediterranean and Middle East region on both east and westbound
voyages.  This will give the ships more chance to utilise their huge capacity instead
of carrying only containers to/from the Far East. The second is lightening the
Malacca-max, which in addition, will enable it to transit the Suez Canal.
East of Port Said Port will have an initial capacity of 250000 TEU with a potential
for 1 million.  The construction of the new harbour has already begun by a
consortium of contractors.  Phase one, now well underway, consists of a 1200 m of
container-handling quay, dredging the approach channel, northern and middle
turning circles, and inland channel; constructing a new break water, shortcut,
berthing channel and widening the canal by-pass; and constructing a 1200 m x 500 m
container terminal and other general cargo/dry bulk terminal.  Phase two consists of a
further 1200 m of container quay wall, the construction of two Basins and expanding
the container terminal.
The container terminal infrastructure, equipment and operation are funded by private
investment.  A road tunnel beneath the Canal, from the East port industrial area, is
also privately funded.  The contract to build and operate the container handling
terminal for 30 years has been awarded to the Suez container terminal company,
which is a joint venture between Europe Combined Terminals (ECT) and Maersk,
together with a group of Egyptian investors.  An estimate of US$130 million will be
invested in the Terminal.  Completion slated for the end of 2002.
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Figure 4.1 East Port Said port lay-out
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Transport and communication
The port will be connected to the rest of the country by road and rail bridges, over
the Suez Canal, set to open at the end of 2000 and early 2001 respectively.  These
links have an effect on the success of the port to capture a slice of some 12 million
TEU per annum that is expected to be transhipped in the region in the future.
In addition, an industrial area and free zone is being developed adjacent to the port
which is expected to add an incentive to attract international ship owners/operators to
the new port.
On the southern side of Suez Canal, the site of new port North Al-Sokhna has been
chosen in the vicinity of the free industrial zone Northwest Suez Gulf.  The location
leads to the main road network through Suez.  The area of the port is about 22 square
km, with 8700m. of berth length.  It consists of 4 main docks; the first one allocated
is planned to begun operation in the first half of 2000.  The port has a navigational
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channel 3325 m long, 350 m wide and 17 m deep with 2 breakwaters 960 and 770 m
in length respectively and a 650 m diameter turning circle.  The two Northern docks
are 750 m in length, 350 m in width each and the two southern docks are 100 m in
length and 350m and 250 m in width with a depth of 17 m which can be deepened in
future stages.
A concession by the Egyptian government was awarded to North Al-Sokhna Port
Development Company (SPDC) to manage the port with a renewable 2-year Build
Operate and Transfer (BOT) agreement.  The agreement requires that SPDC furnish
the terminal cranes and container handling equipment, manage the port operations
and promote the advantages of the port internationally.  Other partners in SPDC
include the Stevedoring Services of America (SSA), which specialises in designing,
constructing and operating port and rail facilities, and the Egyptian Container
Handling Company  (ECHCO) which primarily provides terminal handling services
for the fleet of American President Lines (APL) calling on Egypt from the USA and
Far East, (ECHCO has a 60% stake in SPDC)
Figure 4.2 North Al-Sokhna port lay-out
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Transport and Communication
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4.3 The Suez Canal
The importance of the Suez Canal in the service of world trade is clearly
demonstrated by the volume which passes through it.  The saving in distance sailed
between Europe and Asia is significant, consequently, the saving in fuel costs will
have a direct effect on freight rates.  Thus, the canal has an impact on the world
economy.
The first canal to link the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea is believed to have
been in 1874 BC built by Farao Senaurset III. Ever since, modification of this canal
has taken place until it was filled in by the Caliph Abu-Jafar-Al-Mansour in 767 AD
for strategical reasons.
On 30 November 1848 the Viceroy of Egypt issued a “Firman of Concession” to
construct a canal based on the request of the French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps.
A final concession was granted in January 1856 and the constructing work on the
canal begun in April 1859.  The concession to operate the canal was awarded to a
limited company, Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, with shares to
subscribers in Egypt,  France and Great Britain, primarily governmental but also
private investors.  It took 10 years to complete the construction of the canal.
On 26 July 1956 President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, the previous British
and French shares in the operating Company received from Egypt being
compensated for on the basis of the value of their shares.  An international furore
followed and the Canal was closed for 165 days from 26 October 1956 to 10 April
1957.
On 5 June 1967, the Canal was again closed for 8 years untill 5 June 1975.
However, the first ship could transit the Canal from November 1974.  Development
of the Suez Canal has taken place ever since the beginning in 1869, but over the last
30 years enlargement has been significant.
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Table 4.6 Enlargement of the Suez Canal
Year Area (Sq. m.) Max. Draft (m.) Av. Width (m.) Max Dwt (tones)
1869 310 6.76 45.86 7000
1900 460 7.8 58.97 10000
1908 680 8.53 79.72 14000
1912 720 8.53 84.41 14000
1914 870 8.84 98.42 16000
1954 1200 10.67 112.46 32000
1961 1600 11.28 141.84 45000
1964 1800 11.58 155.44 65000
1980 3700 16.16 228.96 150000
2010 280000
Source: Wijnolst N., Malacca Max, Delft University Press, the Netherlands
Due to the constant expansion of the Canal the maximum dimensions are increasing.
At the moment (august 2000), the maximum allowable draft is 17.63 m.  The width
of the Canal is 3 times the breadth of the largest expected vessel at that draft.
The following factors are taken into account when calculating the minimum required
depth of the Canal
• Maximum accepted ship’s draft
• Squat effect (maximum 1.07 m)
• Dynamic trim (maximum 0.15 m)
• Keel clearance (1 m)
• Dredging tolerance (0.91 m)
• Tidal range
• Seasonal influences
The Suez Canal Authority (SCA) expects to reach an allowed draft of 18.85 m by
this year.  Further plans of achieving a depth of 22 m will take place between 2000
and 2013.
39
Fairplay Daily News (18 August 2000) mentioned “Egypt has given the go-ahead for
the work to widen and deepen the Suez Canal which would allow the passage of
VLCCs, according to news agency reports.  The $441M project will allow 250,000
DWT ships with 66-foot draughts to use the canal in 2005, and by 2010, 350,000
DWT vessels of 72-foot draught will be allowed through.  The expansion work will
increase the width of the Suez Canal from 345 to 400 m and its depth from 22 to 25
m”.
Transit dues are calculated on the basis of Suez Canal net tonnage  (the gross
tonnage-enclosed spaces for machinery, equipment, crew and void spaces).  Pilotage
tugs (if applicable) and surcharge (for deck containers in container ships) are
additional. Loaded vessels over 170.000 DWT will be escorted by two tugs. Rates of
Escorting Tugboats (a Unified Canal Passenger rate of 6600 SDR is to be paid for
each escorting tug. This table illustrate an overview of the dues in 1998.
           Table 4.7 Suez Canal dues
Suez Canal net tonnage
First 5000 Next 5000 Next 10000 Next 20000 Next 30000    Rest of
Vessel Condition Laden Ballast Laden Ballast Laden Ballast Laden Ballast Laden Ballast Laden Ballast
Vessel Type SDR/ SCNT
Crude oil 6.49 5.52 3.62 3.08 3.25 2.77 1.40 1.19 1.40 1.19 1.21 1.03
Product 6.75 5.52 3.77 3.08 3.43 2.77 1.93 1.19 1.93 1.19 1.93 1.19
LPG Carrier 6.75 5.75 3.77 3.21 3.43 2.92 2.42 2.06 2.42 2.06 2.42 2.06
Dry Bulk 7.21 6.13 4.14 3.52 2.97 2.53 1.05 0.90 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.85
Container 7.21 6.13 4.10 3.49 3.37 2.87 2.42 2.06 2.42 2.06 1.83 1.56
Source: Wijnolst N., Malacca Max, Delft University Press, the Netherlands
The dues of fully laden Malacca-max, Suez-max and Maersk s-class container
ships with Suez net tonnage (SCNT) 190000, 122000 and 60000 tonnes respectively
are estimated as follows:
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                                Table 4.8 Suez Canal Dues Calculation
Fees Malacca - Max Suez - Max Maersk s-class
in Dues in Dues in Dues in Dues in Dues in Dues in
Item SDR SDR US$ SDR US$ SDR US$
For the first   5000 SCNT 7.21 36050 49749
For the next   5000 SCNT 4.1 20500 28290
For the next 10000 SCNT 3.37 33700 46506
For the next 20000 SCNT 2.42 48400 66792
For the next 30000 SCNT 2.42 72600 100188 24200 33396
Total
For each additional SCNT 1.83 311100 429318 95160 131321 0 0
Total 430850 594573 306410 422846 162850 224733
Surcharge 14% 60319 83240 42897 59198 22799 31463
Total 491169 677813 349307 482044 185649 256196
Each escorting Tug 6600 13200 18216 13200 18216 0 0
Grand Total 504369 696029 362507 500260 185649 256196
Source: Based on Suez Canal Authority tables and circulars
The cost of a single passage of 6000 TEU vessel is about US$ 256196.  This is a
significant cost element for the ship-owner, but against it, a voyage between
Northern Europe and the Far East would take about 6 days more if the vessel had to
proceed via the Cape of Good Hope.  In bunker alone the cost would be some
US$40000, about an extra 1344 tons being required.
The economies of scale in shipping make it relatively cheap for larger vessels to sail
around the Cape of Good Hope.  Thus, lower rates are offered to them when
transiting the Canal.  This explains the increase in transiting net tonnage and the drop
in net income.
Table 4.9 Suez Canal Traffic
Year Number Of ships Net Ton. in 1000 % of total Traffic
Container Total Container Total In number In Net ton
1994 3713 16370 108217 364487 22.7 29.7
1995 3765 15051 116276 360371 25 32.2
1996 4082 14731 130164 354974 27.8 36.7
1997 4012 14430 138839 386720 27.8 37.7
1998 4049 13471 154095 386069 30 39.9
1999 4375 13490 168245 384994 32.4 43.7
Source: Suez Canal Authority Yearly reports 1994-1999
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As shown in the table in the last six years the total number of ships transiting the
Canal dropped by 2880 ships (17.6%), while the net tonnage increased by 20507000
tons (5.6%) indicating that the average ship size increased. Container traffic in
particular has increased both in ships’ number by 662 ships (17.8%) and in net
tonnage by 60028000 tons (55.5%). The percentage of transiting container ships
through the canal of all other vessels is considered high (43.7% in 1999), which
reveals an increase in trading volumes on the East-West trade route.




The development of land bridges is highly related to integrated transport systems.
Equally containerisation is highly related to multimodal transport.
The concept of land bridge is not recent, the idea going back several hundred years
when trade between Europe and Asia, by the ancient caravan trade, used the “Silk
route”. Land bridge means using land transport for a part of an ocean voyage for the
purpose of reducing transit time and cost.
The important land bridges in the world exists in 3 main regions in the world; North
America, Russia and Middle East.  Long ago, Europe used land bridges in trading
with China and India.  The “Silk route” was used to transport goods from Europe
through ports in Turkey and by road in Asia to China.  The Egyptian land bridge to
transport goods from Europe was through the ports of Rossetta and Damietta on the
Mediterranean Coast, then by road to Suez then by sea to India.
The economical aim of land bridging is to save both cost and transport time.  Liner
operators save cost in using land bridges by concentrating on calling at fewer ports
which have good connections to the hinterland by road, rail or inland water modes,
thus saving on cost and time by calling at fewer ports.  Also they can achieve better
service in reaching land-locked countries.
There are five important land bridges are:
1) North American land bridge
This serves both the international trade and US foreign trade.  By using the land
bridge, international trade transits the United States from west to east or from east to
west.  For the foreign trade of the United States a mini-bridge and a micro-bridge are
used.  The mini bridge ends with a port (e.g. Hong Kong -New York) and the micro
bridge ends at an inland point (e.g. Hong Kong - Chicago).
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2) Canadian land bridge
This was operated before the American land bridge. It acted as a joint between the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by using railroad.
3) Mexican land bridge
This joins the port of Coatza Coulos on the Gulf of Mexico and Salina Cruz port on
the Pacific Ocean.  This land bridge saves about 1000 miles in voyage distance from
New York to Los Angeles if compared with Panama Canal transiting.  It competes
with the American and the Canadian land bridges.
4) Trans-Siberia land bridge
This land bridge joins Europe with the Far East. It consists of 4 main mutlimodal
systems as follows:
a. Ocean-Rail route
Containers are transported by ships from Japan to Nakhoda then Vostochny ports
in Eastern Russia, then by rail through Siberia to Moscow then to Chop in
Slovakia, Brest in Poland, Djulfa in Iran, Kushka in Afghanistan, Urgeny in
Romania or Luzakia in Finland.
b. Ocean-Rail-Ocean route
Containers are transported from a Japanese port to Nakhoka or Vostochny in
Eastern Russia, then by rail to Baltic Sea or Black sea ports, then by ship
Scandinavia and Europe or Mediterranean ports
c. Ocean-Rail-Truck route
Containers are transported from Japanese ports to Eastern Russian ports then by
rail to Moscow then by trucks to Germany, France or Switzerland.
d. Ocean-Truck-Air-Truck route
Containers are transported by sea from Japan to Eastern Russia then by trucks to
Vladivostock then by air to Luxembourg then by trucks to final destination in
Europe.
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5) Middle East land bridges
The political instability in the Middle East, in addition to the successive closure to
the Suez Canal, resulted in the initiation of intermodal land bridges.
The search for an alternative was essential especially for the Gulf States, which was
greatly affected by the closure of the Canal. The alternative route for shipping,
around the Cape of Good Hope, was an expensive one due to the high cost of using
more fuel and more transit time. Meanwhile when the sudden demand on shipping to
import goods to the oil-rich countries took place, the Gulf Peninsula lacked port
facilities. The use of a land bridge was the most cost-effective way to trade.
The four main land bridges in the Middle East are:
a. The Turkish land bridge
Cargo is shipped from Europe to a Turkish port in Mediterranean then by trucks to
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia. This land bridge was still operating even
after the reopening of the Sues Canal and the vast improvement of port and shipping
facilities in the Gulf Peninsula. The reason for this was the safe passage, due to the
Iraq-Iran war and the considerable savings both in transit time and transport cost.
b. Lebanon  land bridge
This was used like the Turkish land bridge but due to the political instability in
Lebanon and the reopening of the Suez Canal it did not develop.
c. Israeli land bridge “Kedim”
Another land bridge formed because of the closure of the Suez Canal is the Negev
Continental Bridge (NCB). The main purpose of this land bridge is to transport
containers between Europe and the Mediterranean at one end and the Indian Ocean
and Far East at the other end. After the reopening of the Suez Canal this land bridge
did not cease operation. Kedem Land Bridge Company, a subsidiary of the Zim
Navigation Company, operates the Kedem land bridge. It is part of a worldwide
intermodal transport system operated by Zim.
This land bridge links the port of Ashdod on the Mediterranean cost with port of





The further dredging of the Suez Canal to achieve a depth of 72 feet is expected
between 2010 and 2013.  The dredging is an expensive operation and unless its cost
is offset by the income generated from the transiting of larger ships it will not be
urgent.  However, the Suez Canal Authority has this operation planned.
For a large container carrier like Malacca-Max the transiting of the Suez Canal is an
essential part of its voyage.  As mentioned before, it will be deployed in the East-
West trading route because of its size.  With a draft of 21 metres it will be impossible
for it to pass the Canal at the present time.  The only way to do that is by lightening it
to reach the maximum permissible draft of (17m.).
The modes of transport on the suggested land bridge are Road and Rail.  The major
features of the infrastructure for both modes exists apart from the rail connections to
ports which are still under construction. Both ports are not yet operative, therefore
the tariffs and dues of other similar ports of the Red Sea ports and lighthouse
administration is applied.  Similarly the rail and road tariffs are approximate from the
Egyptian rail authority and from private contractors.
The suggested solution is composed of two parts. The first part deals with a cost
analysis of the Malacca-Max container ship.  The result is a cost comparison of the
slot cost, slot cost per mile and transport cost per TEU of this ship and other
container ships.  This is demonstrated in two scenarios of operational patterns.
The second part deals with the cost of the land bridge.  The result is a cost
comparison between using the land bridge and using the Suez Canal.
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5.2 Cost analysis of two Malacca-max scenarios
• First scenario:
The voyage starts at Rotterdam (Europe) and is bound for Singapore (Asia). In
addition to the containers being carried to the Far East, other containers are to be
carried to the Mediterranean and the Middle East in both directions.  This part will be
discharged at East of Port Said port, on the eastbound leg, until it reaches the
required draft.  A transhipment operation, either by using the suggested land bridge
or direct by feeders, will then take place to deliver these containers to their final
destination.
Similarly on the west bound leg some containers will be carried to the Mediterranean
and the Middle East.  These containers will be transhipped at the new North Al-
Sokhna port at the Red Sea (Gulf of Suez) either by feeders or by using the suggested
land bridge.
The majority of the containers, which will be discharged at East of Port Said Port on
the eastbound leg, will be destined for Mediterranean ports.  Similarly, on the west
bound leg the majority of the containers, which will be discharged at North Al-
Sokhna, will be destined for Red Sea ports.  However, the land bridge can be used to
serve the opposite side as well.
• Second scenario
Similar to the first in concept but achieving a higher utilisation ratio, the vessel will
call twice at each of East of Port Said Port and North Al-Sokhna port as follows.
The voyage starts at Rotterdam East bound for East of Port Said Port for the
lightening operation, then passing through the Canal and calling at North Al-Sokhna
port to load again containers transhipped via the land bridge from Damietta on the
Mediterranean side to North Al-Sokhna on the Red Sea side for destined Singapore.
Similarly, on the west bound leg, which starts at Singapore, the vessel will call at
North Al-Sokhna port for lightening then transit the Canal and call at East of Port
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Said Port to load transhipped containers from the Mediterranean bound for
Rotterdam in northern Europe.
This solution is based on the idea of maximum utilisation of the ship on both the east
and westbound legs.  The containers to be loaded or unloaded at both ends of the
Canal are to and from the Mediterranean and Red Sea markets as follows:
Table 5.1 Suggested operational pattern of Malacca-Max
Port Operation Container Origin Container Destination
East bound
Rotterdam Loading N. Europe Med. / Red Sea / Far East
East Port Said Port Unloading N. Europe Med.
North Al-Sokhna Loading Med. / Red Sea Far East
Singapore Unloading N. Europe / Med. / Red Sea Far East
West bound
Singapore Loading Far East N. Europe /Med. /Red Sea
North Al-Sokhna Unloading Far East Red Sea / Med.
East Port Said Port Loading Med. / Red Sea N. Europe
Rotterdam Unloading Far east / Med. / Red Sea N. Europe
To begin with, the number of containers to be unloaded, for the lightening operation,
can be calculated as follows based on the ship’s specifications the Tons Per
Centimetre Immersion (TPC):
TPC  = WPA/97.56 (where WPA is water plan area in Sq.  metres)
WPA = L *B *Cw (length at water level *Breadth *Coefficient of fineness)
Cw    = Area of water plan/area of rectangular having the extreme dimensions
         = 380*60/390*60 = 0.974
WPA = 390*60*0.974 = 22791.6 Sq.  metres
TPC  = 22791.6/97.57 = 233.62 ton
Number of containers to be discharged
Draft difference = present draft- required draft
                          = 2100 – 1700 = 400 centimetres
Tonnes to be unloaded = TPC * draft difference  = 234 * 400 = 93600 tonnes
Number of containers (based on average load 12 t. / TEU) = 93600/12 = 7800 TEU
The vessel loads 75% FEUs and 25% TEUs (assuming that the containers to be
unloaded here are of the same ratio)
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The Number of TEUs to be discharged = 7800*25%      = 1950 boxes
The Number of FEUs to be discharged = 7800*75% / 2  = 2925 boxes
Total Number of Boxes to be discharged                         = 4875 boxes
The time needed to unload this number of containers in each port at both ends of the
Canal (assuming that there are 3 gantry cranes each capable of doing 70 moves per
hour) will be:
Time for unloading or loading = Number of boxes / total capacity of 3 gantry cranes
                                                 = 4875/210 = 23.2 hours
Calculations are based on the following economic evaluation of the design done by
Wijnolst N., Scholtens M.  and Waals F.  in “Malacca-Max the ultimate container
Carrier”.  The author has noticed that the Suez Canal dues were mistakenly used in
US$ while they are in SDR units and should have been converted to US$. He has
avoided this in his calculations. This is why some differences exist.
In addition, the following assumptions are taking place in both scenarios
1) Suez Canal:1
a. Dues are as per table 4.8 in chapter 4, no surcharge for deck containers is
added.
b. Two escorting tugs in any Suez canal Passage are added (DWT.  is over
170000 t.)
c. Consumption during passage is only M.D.O
d. Transit time is 24 hours  (actual steaming is only 16 hours)
e. Speed is variable during transiting
f. Surcharge for deck containers is eliminated in both scenarios
2) Number of containers used in cost calculations is the weighted average
3) Egyptian port:
a. Dues are based on the tariff of the Egyptian Authority for Red Sea Ports.
2) Distances between ports are in nautical miles.
3) All the numbers are rounded up to 0 decimal.
                                                
1 Canal dues in table 5.2 are different than in table 5.3 (original scenario)
because dues in table 5.2 are written in US$ while they are in reality in SDR
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Table 5.2 Economic evaluation of Malacca-Max




Tonnage dues 0.45 93600 0
Loading costs 0 48.6
Mooring dues 4720 1
Agency fees 0
Other expenses 10000 0
Idle time in port 1
Total costs/time Rotterdam 151190 57




Tonnage dues 0.3 62400 0
Loading costs 0 48.6
Mooring dues 4720 1
Agency fees 0
Other expenses 10000 0
Idle time in port 1
Total costs/time Singapore 119990 57
Trip Length Fuel costs 729132 846
Voyage costs + Terminal handling 2070650 1007
Costs per TEU (US$) Round trip costs (US$)
Slot costs (US$/TEU/day) 7.31 Capital costs 2079406
TCE (US$/TEU/day) 4.29 Operational costs 861972
Cost/slot/mile (US$/TEU/mile) 0.019 Voyage costs 2070650
Transport cost/TEU 153 Terminal handling charges 0
Miscellaneous costs 0
Ship Particulars Total costs 5012028
Loa 400
B (m) 60 Voyage characteristics
T (m) 21 Type of cargo Cont.
Speed (Kn.) 25 HFO price (US$/ton) 75
Light ship weight (ton) 70771 HFO Consum. (ton/sea day) 513
DWT (ton) 243800 MDO price (US$/ton) 130
GT (ton) 208000 MDO Consum. (ton/port day) 36
NT (ton) 110000 Sailing speed (kn.) 19.5
Suez Canal Net (ton) 190000
TEU capacity 18154 Cargo characteristics
Cargo capacity (containers) 11346 Load factor  W/E bound 90%
Crew No. 25 Loading Cap. (moves /hr.) 420
Building price (US$000) 181500 FEU % in load 75%
Engine power (kw.) 120000
Service speed 25
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The cost evaluation for different container ships is illustrated in the following table.
Table 5.4 Cost comparison of large container ships
COSTS in US$











Tokyo Senator 3017 10.74 5.16 225.71
Hannover Express 4407 46.07% 10.84 0.93% 6.00 16.28% 228.57 1.27%
Hyundey Admiral 4411 0.09% 10.19 -6.00% 5.59 -6.83% 213.71 -6.50%
5000 13.35% 10.00 -1.86% 5.47 -2.15% 210.00 -1.74%
Hanjin London 5302 6.04% 9.89 -1.10% 5.68 3.84% 210.00 0.00%
P&ON
Southampton
6674 25.88% 9.26 -6.37% 5.00 -11.97% 192.86 -8.16%
Maersk K-class 7500 12.38% 9.05 -2.27% 5.20 4.00% 191.43 -0.74%
Maersk S-class 8600 14.67% 8.74 -3.43% 5.05 -2.88% 182.29 -4.77%
10000 16.28% 8.53 -2.40% 4.86 -3.76% 178.57 -2.04%
Suez-Max 12000 20.00% 8.42 -1.29% 4.95 1.85% 177.14 -0.80%
15000 25.00% 7.68 -8.79% 4.65 -6.06% 162.57 -8.23%
Malacca-Max 18154 21.03% 7.78 1.26% 4.25 -8.60% 163.34 0.48%
Malacca-Max 18154 7.78 4.25 163.34
Malacca-Max
scinario1
18154 0.00% 8.78 12.93% 4.25 0.00% 189.37 15.93%
Malacca-Max
scinario2
18154 0.00% 8.01 2.97% 4.25 0.00% 183.53 12.36%
Source: Wijnolst N., Malacca Max, Delft University Press, the Netherlands
The table shows the savings achieved by increasing ship’s size.  However, these
savings are not evident if compared to Time Charter Equivalent.  The transport cost
in this table is only for the deep sea leg which constitutes the smaller part of the
transport cost, the major part being transhipment and through transport costs (80%).
The table shows the increase in cost in the case of applying any of the suggested two
scenarios.  However, the saving is still comparable to the largest vessels running
today (Maersk K-class and Maersk S-class), and the amount in slot cost to –13% &
9.8%, and in transport cost to –2.8% & an increase of 2% respectively.
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5.3 Land bridge cost analysis
The proposed land bridge will join the northern side of Egypt in East of Port Said
Port with the Southern part at North Al-Sokhna at the Red Sea.
The suggested intermodal component of the land bridge will be as follows:
1) New East of Port Said Port – North Al-Sokhna by means of direct rail transport
2) New East of Port Said Port – North Al-Sokhna by road transport
This land bridge will facilitate the trade of Malacca-max container ship by moving
containers for transhipment southward from Damietta port on the Mediterranean
coast to North Al-Sokhna port on the Red Sea coast or vice a versa.
Calculation method:
The calculations of this example will compare the cost of transporting containers
unloaded at North Al-Sokhna to Damietta to be transhipped to Mediterranean ports.
The following is the given data for the example application:
The distance between North Al-Sokhna port to Damietta port by road is 200 Km,
while the distance is 180 Km by rail transport.
The train’s specifications used for this example are:
Number of trains 2
Number of wagons 60 per train
Max. load per wagon 60 T.
NR. of  TEUs per wagon 1x40’ + 1x20’ or  3x20’
Voyage length 180 Km
Voyage time 3 Hrs.
NR. of round voyages per train 2 per day
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Cost by rail
Cost of transport per 20’ loaded box 97.0$
Cost of transport per 40’ loaded box 193.0$
Total cost per wagon (loaded boxes) 290.0 $
Total cost per train 20300$
Cost per 20’ empty box 34.0$
Cost per 40’ empty box 68.0$
Total cost per wagon (empty boxes) 102 $
Total cost per train 7140
The truck specifications used for this example are:
Container truck capacity 1x40’ or 2x20’
Maximum load 40 T.
Voyage time 3 Hrs.
NR. of Voyages per day 6
NR. of trucks available as needed
Cost per truck 150$
Example:
Assumption:
The number of boxes at North Al-Sokhna port to be transported to Damietta is 4875
boxes divided into 2925 40’ containers and 1950 20’ containers.  Required cost and
time of transport cost and time between the two ports by using Suez Canal.
Solution:
By combining both modes, rail will transport 1950 20’ containers  and 1950 40’
containers.  The remaining 975 40’ containers  will be transported by truck.
However, the solution will show the cost and time of transporting the whole number
of containers by train only.
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1) By using train only (cost and time calculations):
Train cost calculations
Day Nr. Of Trips Nr.of 20’ cost $ Nr. of 40’ cost $ Total $
1 4 280 27160 280 54040 81200
2 4 280 27160 280 54040 81200
3 4 280 27160 280 54040 81200
4 4 280 27160 280 54040 81200
5 4 280 27160 280 54040 81200
6 4 280 27160 280 54040 81200
7 4 270 26190 285 55005 10150
8 4 0 280 54040 10150
9 4 0 280 54040 10150
10 4 0 280 54040 10150
11 2 0 120 23160 10150
Total 1950 189150 2925 564525 753675
The combination of rail and road will be as follows:
960 40’ containers will be transported by road and 1965 by rail in addition to 1950
20’ containers by rail.  The cost by rail will be US$568395 (until day 7 only).
The  cost of trucking is as follows:
Total NR.  of trips needed 960, cost per truck is US$150.  Therefore total cost by
road is US$144000.   the total cost when a combination of rail and road is used will
be:
568395 + 144000 = US$712395 (cheaper than rail only)
Truck time calculations.
Time calculation is flexible as it depends on the number of used trucks but the
following can be assumed:
By using 100 trucks, each truck makes 3 trips per day; i.e. there are 300 trips a day.
Total time needed for containers = total trips/ trips per day = 3 days
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2) By transiting the Suez Canal (cost and time calculations):
Transport 7900 TEU needs a large ship (assuming Maersk s-class)
Time: 24 hours
Cost of transiting Suez Canal   = US$230000.0
Transport cost  = 182.3*7900   = US$1440170.0
Total cost                                  = US$1670170.0
Table 5.5 Cost comparison between land bridge and sea transport
Mode Cost  US$ Time
Rail 753675 10.5 days
Rail & Road 712395 7 days
Sea transport 1670170 1.0 day
The final result shows that the combination of rail and road is more feasible than
using only one mode.  Similarly, the land bridge is more feasible than the Suez
Canal.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
Since the quantity of twenty and forty feet containers is always changing and the
assumptions, in both scenarios, deal only with certain percentages, (25% & 75%)
therefore a sensitivity analysis is needed to see the impact of the change in box size,
in addition to the impact of the reduced productivity of gantry cranes.
This analysis will deal with the quantity of containers and the discharging rate either
at East of Port Said Port or North Al-Sokhna Port.  The impact of these changes will
be noticed on loading / unloading time (time in port), thus increasing the whole
round voyage time which, in turn, will result in an increase in capital, operation and
voyage costs.
56
Table 5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
Impact %
Ship's Load Load/ Unload Port 1st Scenario 2nd Scenario
Quantity Mixture Total Rate Time Time Cost Cost
In TEUs % FEU/TEU Boxes Box/Hr Hrs. Hrs. Total /slot/d Trans Total /slot/d Trans
8700 100/0 3900/0 3900 210 18.6 -20 5418023 8.80 188 5795513 8.05 182
8700 75/25 2925/1950 4875 210 23.2 0 546690 8.78 189 5852847 8.01 184
8700 50/50 1950/3900 5850 210 27.9 20 5475981 8.76 191 5911428 7.96 186
8700 25/75 975/5850 6825 210 32.5 40 5504648 8.74 192 5968762 7.92 188
8700 0/100 0/8700 7800 210 37.1 60 5533315 8.72 193 6026097 7.88 190
157 24.8 7 5456662 8.77 190 5872789 7.99 184
157 31.1 34 5495923 8.75 192 5951313 7.94 187
157 37.3 61 5534562 8.72 193 6028589 7.88 190
157 43.5 87 5573200 8.69 195 6105866 7.83 193
157 49.7 114 5611838 8.66 196 6183143 7.78 196
This table is in two parts. The upper part deals with the maximum loading/unloading
rate of 210 boxes per hour, while the lower part deals with the lesser rate (75%
utilisation).  In both parts the same mixture of boxes is dealt with.  The bold line
represents the base for comparison (case illustrated in table 5.3).
As seen in both tables the box size and the loading/unloading rate has a direct impact
on both time in port and costs.  The ideal case will be all boxes of forty feet and
using the maximum loading/unloading rate of 210 boxes per hour.
5.5 Transhipment comparison
The differences between the two main alternatives, dredging the Suez Canal or not,
can be summarised as follows:
1) In the case of dredging the Suez Canal, Malacca-max will transit the canal and
transhipment of the Mediterranean cargo, if any, will be done through Rotterdam
by different means (i.e. short sea shipping or by land or by combination).
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2) In the case of the Suez Canal not being dredged, Malacca-max will unload the
Mediterranean cargo loaded at Singapore at North Al-Sokhna port then
transhipment will  take place from there as follows:
a. By the suggested land bridge, and in this case the cargo will be transported
multimodaly to Damietta port on the Mediterranean coast, then by feeders to
its final destination
b. By using feeders direct from North Al-Sokhna port to the final destination, or
to a Mediterranean hub port, thereafter to the final destination. In both cases
transiting the Suez Canal will be part of the cost.
In addition, some factors are to be considered as well like the ship size which will be
deployed in the transhipment operation and finding suitable employment afterwards.
It can be concluded that the most suitable way to tranship the Mediterranean cargo is
by the land bridge.  Despite the cost and time involved, the cargo itself will increase
the utilisation factor of this ship.  The size of cargo required to fill the Malacca-max
is too large, especially if only serving two markets.
The following assumptions are made for the purpose of the comparison:
1) Number of containers FEU/TEU = 2925/1950
2) Different ship sizes are used in comparison
3) Terminal handling charges are not included in calculations.
4) Time calculation is 24 hours for loading and 24 hours for the passage including
transiting the Suez Canal.
5) In the case of using a ship that cannot accommodate all the quantity, the total cost
is multiplied by a factor = (total load/actual ship’s load).
6) The Suez Canal dues are based on approximate SCNT.
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Train and truck Land 168 712395 11.7 82
Ship of 3017 TEU Sea 138 5.16 548321 11 63
Ship of 4407 TEU Sea 95 6 455768 13.1 52
Ship of 5302 TEU Sea 79 5.68 402508 14 46
Ship of 6674 TEU Sea 63 5 357162 15.6 41
Ship of 7400 TEU Sea 56 5.20 301695 15 35
Ship of 8700 TEU Sea 48 5.05 344066 20 40
As illustrated in the table, the differences in transhipment costs between the land
bridge and the sea transport is not large when the cost per TEU per day is considered.
However, one can argue that the major difference is in time.
From a different perspective it can be said that the use of a ship in transhipping this
large quantity of containers for this distance is not practical. On the other hand, if
smaller vessels are used, the increase in time will be very high, besides finding
employment for such vessels in the area.
In the case of transhipment taking place from Rotterdam to the Mediterranean, as this
may be the case in the original scenario, there will be no need to do any comparison.
The purpose of the comparison is to find out the cost and time involved in the
transhipment operation from one point to another by different modes. If
Mediterranean cargo is transhipped from Rotterdam, evidently there are different
cost and time elements that do not match the first and the second scenarios.
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Figure 5.1 Land bridge illustration














The investigation in this dissertation is on the effect and the possible future of very
big container ships.  The choice was the Malacca-max and the study that has been
done has involved the dredging of the Suez Canal.
The topic of this dissertation is to investigate an alternative to dredging, namely to
seek different operational patterns and to establish a land bridge by the use of
different ports that enable the Malacca-max to pass through the Suez Canal without
dredging.
The conclusion is that it appears that if the figures are examined carefully, the total
cost per TEU will be comparable to the total cost of a Malacca-max passing fully
laden through the Suez Canal, which indicates that it might not be necessary to
dredge the Suez Canal.
The cost of transhipment was also calculated given some assumptions as to how
many containers originated in Rotterdam and Singapore that end up in the Middle
East and the Mediterranean. It shows that the cost of transhipment by land bridge, if
compared with feeder ships, is comparable but it is not practical to use ships because
of the difficulty of finding suitable employment that matches this size.
When considering the solution, which involves the preparation of Egypt’s new ports
at both ends of the Canal the following is recommended
1) A suitable infrastructure that serves this massive container movements.
2) Suitable arrangements for handling this size of ships and which includes the size
of container handling cranes, shore handling equipment and staking yards.
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3) Suitable depths both at the navigational channel and at the quay side.
4) Suitable technology that matches the requirements of reliable and fast handling of
transhipment operation.
5) Professional personnel.
6) Well planned marketing.
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